PROJECTED INVASION OF SWEDEN to co-operate. Denmark and Russia both proposed that an English squadron of considerable size should combine with theirs in a naval attack upon Sweden. The Dano-Russian fleet would number perhaps thirty-two vessels, but it was still insufficient to attack the Swedish fleet lying in the main naval base at Karlskrona. Definite assurances were given during June that an English squadron would sail under the command of Sir John Norris to convoy English merchantmen plying their wares in the Baltic. Rumors indicated that this squadron would be given instructions to join the Dano-Russian fleet and to act in collaboration with them.
In spite of these illusory commitments Anglo-Russian relations were stormy. Unfortunately, when Prince Nikita Repnin and the Russian troops had been denied admittance to Wismar in 1716 because of the absence of an agreement covering their assistance, responsibility for the Dano-Prussian attitude was attributed to Hanover. In addition, a pact signed between Prussia, Denmark, and Hanover stated that Wismar was to be turned over to the Emperor Charles VI as an imperial city. Peter, on the contrary, wished the city as his personal prize, having already promised it to the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin as a part of the dowry of the Duchess Catherine, who had married the duke in April, 1716. A second source of conflict was the presence of Russian troops in Mecklenburg. Andreas Gottlieb Bernstorff, George I's famous Hanoverian minister, who had the greatest influence upon his master, held estates and noble rank in the duchy. The Duke and his nobility were involved in a dispute over prerogatives, privileges, and estates when Russian troops arrived and were placed under the authority of the Duke to be used against the nobility. Bernstorff consequently was inimical to Russia as she was aiding in clipping his privileges. Furthermore, public opinion in Hanover disapproved of the marriage of the Duchess Catherine and the Duke of Mecklenburg since it threatened to give Russia a foothold in northern Germany.
The new phase of the northern war, opened by the signature of the Altona Convention, was also troublesome to both Denmark and Russia. Frederick IV lacked the mental agility to cope with rapidly moving events, and the military arrangements for the in-227 vasion strained the capacity of his government and treasury. The navy and merchant fleet had to be renovated to handle the immense task of transporting and supplying troops from northern Germany and, when the occasion arose, to support the military operations in Sweden. In Copenhagen confusion reigned supreme, and even the Czar, who arrived on July 17, was unable to correct Danish inefficiency and procrastination.3 Peter himself was impatiently awaiting the arrival of his troops from Mecklenburg; chief among the reasons for his uneasiness was his fear that they would arrive too late and the invasion would have to be postponed until the following year.4 Eventually a Danish naval squadron arrived from Norway on August 8 and was dispatched to cover the transport of troops from Mecklenburg and Germany to Copenhagen.5
In that city the Czar and Norris, who had become great friends during the latter's visit of the previous year to the Baltic as commander of the English squadron, were able to reach an agreement The Danes were equally resolved that Russian troops were not to remain in Denmark. Where these troops were sent was immaterial to the Danes, but they must depart from Danish territory. Frederick IV in a letter to the Czar, dated September 23, showed his willingness to allow Russian troops to remain if they were used for the Skaane invasion but refused an offer of fifteen battalions on the plea that such a number would be insufficient to 
